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3
CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUN TION AND EXECUTIVE
LAWMAKING DURING THE OBAMA ADMNISTRATION
RAQUEL ALDANA1
The essays in this symposium volume were presented at the
2015 Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Annual Meeting 
as part of an academic program titled Congressional Dysfunction and
Executive Lawmaking During the Obama Administration. The inspira-
tion for the title came from the simultaneous reactions of tamed en-
thusiasm2 and anger to a memorandum issued by Secretary Jeh
Charles Johnson of the U.S Department of Homeland Security on No-
vember 14, 2014, titled Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion With Re-
spect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children
[(DACA II)] and With Respect to Certain Individuals Who are Parents
of U.S. Citizens and Permanent Residents [(DAPA)].3 The memoran-
dum expanded on an earlier one adopted by then Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security on June 15, 2012, titled Exer-
cising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came
to the United States as Children [(DACA I)].4 Combined, these mem-
oranda constituted executive actions that would potentially defer the
1. Associate Dean for Faculty Scholarship and Professor of Law, McGeorge School of
Law, University of the Pacific. I thank Professors Jennifer Chacón and Alina Das for co-organ-
izing with me the AALS academic program. Thanks also to Tania Dominguez for her great re-
search assistance. I congratulate the Chicago-Kent Law Review editors for their incredible 
professionalism.
2. Enthusiasm came from pro-immigrant groups and from the beneficiaries of deferred
action. Enthusiasm was tamed because some felt deferred action came too late or was too 
limited or did not compensate for the aggressive enforcement policies during the Obama ad-
ministration. See  e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration 
Law Redux, 124 YALE L.J. 2 (forthcoming 2015)
3. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to León
Rodríguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with 
Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain 
Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents (Nov. 20, 2014) (on 
file at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf). 
4. Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of the Homeland Sec., to David V.
Aguilar et al., Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 
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removal of an estimated four to six million5 eligible undocumented 
persons for a few years.6 Those granted the deferral would also ob-
tain work authorization7 and with it social security numbers and 
driver’s licenses.8 To date, however, just over one million applicants 
have been granted deferred action under these memoranda.9 The ex-
planation for this is two-fold. First, the anticipated number of appli-
cants were either over estimations or fewer than those eligible
actually applied.10 Second, twenty-six states immediately challenged 
the legality of the November 14 memorandum in a federal district 
court in Brownsville, Texas, which granted the preliminary injunction 
in February 2015.11 The suit alleged that the memorandum violated, 
inter alia, the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA) by not following the required proce-
dures (namely, the notice and comment period), and by exceeding 
statutory authority.12 In May 2015, the Fifth Circuit refused to lift the 
5. County Level DACA-DAPA Estimates by Country or Region, MIGRATION POLICY INST.
(2014), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/datahub/DACA-DAPA-
2013State%20Estimates-Spreadsheet-FINAL.xlsx.
6. The deferred action program as adopted in 2012 was originally for two years, renew-
able for another two. In 2014, deferred action contemplated three additional years attached to 
the original DACA grant.
7. Eligibility is to three subgroups: DACA I, created by the June 12, 2012 memorandum 
and expanded in 2014, applied to children who arrived in the U.S. prior to June 12, 2007 at the 
age of 16 or younger; who either crossed the border without authorization or with visas since 
expired; who had resided continuously in the U.S. since that date; who had graduated from high 
school or were enrolled in high school or in military service; who were not over 31 at the time of 
the application; and who were not disqualified based on the commission of certain crimes. See 
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, supra note 4. DACA II, created by the 
November 14, 2014 memorandum, expanded the DACA I program to eliminate the 31-year cap 
and to extend the date of eligibility arrival as of November 14, 2010. Finally, DAPA, created by 
the November 14, 2014 memorandum, extended deferred action to undocumented parents of 
children born in the United States or those who had LPR status and who also satisfied the 
requirements of a minimum of five-year residency in the U.S. and no significant criminal record. 
See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson to León Rodríguez, supra note 3. 
8. Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration’s DAPA and Expanded DACA 
Programs, NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.nilc.org/dapa&daca.html.
9. Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal 
Year, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (June 30, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Studies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/All
%20Form%20Types/DACA/I821d_performancedata_fy2015_qtr3.pdf.
10. Two Years and Counting: Assessing the Growing Power of DACA, AM. IMMIGRATION 
COUNCIL (June 15, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/special-reports/two-years-and-
counting-assessing-growing-power-daca.
11. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).  
12. Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, State of Texas et al. v. United 
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injunction issued by the Brownsville federal district court, and in No-
vember 2015, a divided Fifth Circuit panel upheld the district court's 
order.13 As a result, the November 14 Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals extension (DACA II) and the Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans (DAPA) programs have yet to be implemented. In contrast, 
the June 2012 DACA I program survived a similar legal challenge—
also in the Fifth Circuit14—leading to a Circuit split.
In this symposium issue,15 the essays discuss the Obama admin-
istration’s immigration deferred actions,16 but also expand the conver-
sation of alleged executive overreach to other areas, including 
immigration enforcement,17 climate change,18 women’s rights,19 em-
ployment discrimination,20 environmental justice,21 affirmative ac-
tion,22 and national security.23 The AALS program sought to bring 
together scholars writing in these various areas to critically examine 
important themes of separation of powers, federalism, and rights. 
Was the accusation of executive overreach even correct? If so, was 
the accusation unique to the Obama administration, at least as com-
pared to previous administrations? Was the Obama administration 
justified in acting alone in a climate of congressional gridlock and par-
tisanship? How might legitimacy be assessed during the Obama ad-
ministration in these areas of law? Should the lens for measuring 
13. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas v. United States, No. 15-
40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015). 
14. Crane ex. rel. Gov. Bryant v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015). 
15. Other important topics not covered in these essays concerned the Obama administra-
tion’s actions in the area of gay rights, clean energy and health. Other examples where the 
Obama administration allegedly has abused its executive power include welfare laws, and drug 
policy. See, e.g., Ted Cruz, Lawless: The Obama Administration’s Expansion of Executive 
Power, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 2, 5–16 (2014).  
16. Jill E. Family, The Executive Power of Process in Immigration Law, 91 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 59 (2016); Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Legitimacy Through the Anti-Discrimination Lens,
91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 207 (2016).
17. Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and Sanctu-
ary Cites After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 12 (2016).
18. Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, The Grass is Not Always Greener: Congressional 
Dysfunction, Executive Action, And Climate Change in Comparative Perspective, 91 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 139 (2016).
19. Pat Treuthart, Feminist-In-Chief? Examining President Obama’s Executive Orders on 
Women’s Rights Issues, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 171 (2016).
20. Id.; Kim, supra note 16. 
21. Rachael E. Salcido, Reviving the Environmental Justice Agenda, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
115 (2016); Kim, supra note 16.
22. Kim, supra note 16. 
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legitimacy be legal or procedural fairness over outcome; that is, irre-
spective of the pragmatic necessity to govern despite all odds, should 
considerations of checks and balances and federalism trump? Alter-
natively, should the ends of doing justice or the urgency of the prob-
lem justify the means? Was the perception of President Obama 
furthering a “progressive” agenda largely through his administration 
even accurate? The essays in this issue offer great insights into these 
questions.
Empirically, it is no easy task to decipher whether the Obama 
administration was any more or less active in exercising sole execu-
tive powers to govern in comparison to other administrations. This in-
quiry is at least important because the critics of the Obama 
administration start from the untested premise that the Obama admin-
istration has been worse in abusing the office of the U.S. presi-
dency.24 One imperfect measurement has been to consider the 
number of executive orders issued during this administration as com-
pared to past administrations. As it turns out, sixteen presidents have 
issued more executive orders than President Obama. Moreover, 
President Obama’s number of executive orders to date—216—pale 
in comparison to the top five presidents whose executive orders range 
from 907 (Harry S. Truman) to 3,721 (Franklin D. Roosevelt).25 How-
ever, as the essays in this issue demonstrate, presidents govern not 
principally through executive orders but rather through mechanisms 
or tools available to them through the administrative state. The essays 
in this issue discuss executive orders issued during the Obama ad-
ministration, but they also focus on agency internal memoranda such 
as the deferred action programs; inter-agency collaboration agree-
ments; memoranda of understanding or collaboration agreements 
with local governments; funding initiatives; and agreements with in-
ternational inter-governmental entities. Further, comparative numbers 
of executive orders alone do not tell us much absent a deeper analy-
sis of the nature and scope of each executive action. Not all executive 
orders, memoranda, or initiatives are created equal, even from the 
narrow inquiries regarding the legal authority to issue them or proce-
24. Jessie Hill, Executive Discretion and the Administrative State Symposium: Introduc-
tion, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 891, 891–92 (2015).
25. Gerhard Peters, Executive Order: Washington-Obama, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
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dural fairness, much less in terms of the broader legitimacy consider-
ations that might take into account such factors as urgency and moral 
imperatives.
This issue’s essays illustrate the complexity of assessing legiti-
macy for sole executive actions—whether legal, procedural or 
moral—and the need to do so on a case-by-case basis. Professor 
Ming H. Chen’s essay titled Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State 
Noncooperation and Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities pro-
vides a strong theoretical framing of the legitimacy inquiry. As she 
explains, “[t]he concept of legitimacy is defined as the recognition of 
the executive branch’s authority to govern is appropriate, proper, and 
just.”26 In the case-by-case assessment, the essays illustrate how le-
gitimacy might be tested through several lenses. For example, one 
important lens pertains to procedural fairness. In Professor Jill Fam-
ily’s essay titled The Executive Power of Process in Immigration Law,
she does not focus her analysis on the more commonly-posed ques-
tion of whether the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) acted 
within the permissible scope of prosecutorial or statutory discretion 
when issuing the DACA and DAPA memoranda. Instead, her focus 
turns to procedural fairness in administrative lawmaking, as these 
standards are codified in the Administrative Procedure Act.27 Under 
the APA, an agency’s rulemaking is governed by notice and comment 
procedures,28 which are supposed to function—at least in theory—to 
improve transparency and public participation.29 Yet, not only with re-
gard to DACA and DAPA,30 administrative agencies, including immi-
gration agencies, generally prefer to govern through memoranda over 
rulemaking, which does not require the same transparency and public 
participation under the APA.31 As Professor Family explains in her 
essay, however, there are procedural concerns with agencies opting 
out of the rulemaking process that should be examined more closely.
Another important procedural consideration is respect for im-
portant structural principles designed to curb abuses of power, such
as checks and balances. These checks and balances can occur hor-
izontally, through interventions by the other branches of government, 
26. Chen, supra note 17, at 14.
27. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2011).
28. Id. at § 553.
29. See, e.g., J. Brad Bernthal, Procedural Architecture Matters: Innovation at the Federal
Communications Commission, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 615 (2014).
30. Id.
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or vertically, through the relationship of the federal government with 
localities. Horizontal checks and balances would include robust judi-
cial review or congressional participation. Here, important initial anal-
ysis has to happen on a case-by-case basis to decide two distinct 
types of questions: (1) Does the U.S. Constitution permit the president 
to act alone? (i.e., is this an area of legal exceptionalism?); and (2) 
Whether the president is, in fact, acting without congressional ap-
proval, in the face of congressional approval, or against congressional 
mandate. Predictably, there is disagreement even on these prelimi-
nary questions. As these essays suggest, President Obama has re-
sorted to three types of sole executive powers to act alone: 
immigration prosecutorial discretion, foreign affairs, and national se-
curity. Whether President Obama has the legal authority to act alone, 
however, deserves scrutiny, which Professor Sudha Setty powerfully 
executes in his essay titled Obama’s National Security Exceptional-
ism. Professor Setty’s article offers perhaps the most damning cri-
tique of the Obama presidency for three related reasons: first, it 
questions whether President Obama is legitimately resorting to na-
tional security powers to continue, inter alia, to detain indefinitely 
those accused of terrorism; second, it challenges the assumption that 
the Obama presidency has largely acted to preserve rights; and third, 
it highlights the abuses that can occur when checks and balances—
here, the absence of judicial scrutiny—are non-existent.32
Checks and balances are not only offered through judicial over-
sight. It can also occur in the dynamics between the federal govern-
ment and states in the implementation of policies—a vertical checks 
and balances.33 The Obama presidency has also been singled out for 
allegedly trampling on state rights.34 However, one theme of the AALS 
session on federalism, which is also revealed in these essays, is that 
claims of the Obama administration’s disregard for state rights have 
been largely overstated. In his relationship with states, President 
Obama has found more success in promoting his policy agenda 
through cooperative federalism models (instead of coercive methods) 
than he has with Congress. Moreover, the administration has been 
more willing to shift its practices in response to state pressure. In this 
32. Setty, supra note 23. 
33. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the 
Separation of Powers Both Vertically and Horizontally, 115 COLUM L. REV. 4, 13 (2015).
34. Rich Tucker & Elizabeth Slattery, Morning Bell: 5 Ways Obama Has Trampled the Con-
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sense, the evidence suggests that there have been more robust ver-
tical checks and balances during the Obama administration than is 
otherwise acknowledged. Several essays in this issue illustrate these 
points. For example, Professor Rachael E. Salcido’s essay titled Re-
viving the Environmental Justice Agenda documents the methodol-
ogy employed by the Obama administration to promote environmental 
justice as largely consisting of federal inter-agency collaboration with 
the public in order to document the needs of communities, produce 
data that can be useful in understanding the nature and scope of the 
environmental justice gap, and ameliorate problems with the provision 
of federal grants.35 Professor Chen describes a more elastic cooper-
ation continuum in the area of immigration law that extends from “will-
ing embrace of federal policy and national standards to uncooperative 
behavior that can revise, reshape or reject national standards.”36 The 
key is that states and other localities, by choosing not to cooperate 
with federal policy, can weaken, slow, or redirect the federal man-
date.37
In the area of DACA and DAPA, both cooperative and uncooper-
ative federalism dynamics have been at play. The twenty-six states 
that sued the federal government for the extended DACA and DAPA 
programs have a more nuanced story to tell. Many of  the states who 
opposed DACA and DAPA, on their own volition, adopted favorable 
policies toward the benefitted undocumented populations—i.e., by 
granting in-state tuition or issuing driver’s licenses—even prior to the 
recent orders.38 Moreover, over fifteen states and the District of Co-
lumbia, and more than seventy city officials, joined an amicus brief in 
support of  the DACA expansion and DAPA  arguing that these pro-
grams offered economic benefits to the local communities.39 Profes-
sor Chen’s article documents the rise and fall of Secure Communities 
35. Salcido, supra note 21, at Part III A & B. The article also discusses the Obama admin-
istration’s greater use of its enforcement authority under the the existing statutory framework to 
advance environmental justice initiatives. These enforcement actions, however, are contem-
plated under existing statutes, such as the Clean Air Act, and do not involve sole executive 
actions. Id. at Part IIC. 
36. Chen, supra note 17, at 20.
37. Id.
38. Ming H. Chen, Understanding the Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration Law,
INST. OF HIGHER LEARNING 34–35 (2015).
39. Brief for the Mayors of New York and Los Angeles et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellants, Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238); Brief for the 
States of Washington et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the United States, Texas v. United 
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also as a direct result of state noncooperation.40 Secure Communities 
is yet another controversial sole executive immigration program that 
began under President George W. Bush’s administration, but which 
was fully implemented during the Obama administration.41 Secure 
Communities is the foil of DACA and DAPA since it secures removal 
of undocumented persons arrested through a mechanism of finger-
printing at booking and information-gathering with immigration data-
bases that function in every local jail as of 2013.42 As Professor Chen 
describes in her essay, state and local resistance to Secure Commu-
nities has now discontinued the program and yielded a new program 
instead, known as Priority Enforcement Program, as of November 
2014.43 Largely, this significant shift is a direct result of strong upward 
vertical pressures of resistance on the federal government.
The legitimacy discussions above cannot be disengaged from 
other important contexts: one is the political, the second is the moral. 
With regard to politics, the question is whether legitimacy inquiries 
over the Obama administration’s sole acts alone should alter when 
considering Congress’ fervent refusal to facilitate almost all policies 
of the Obama administration—seemingly for political rather than sub-
stantive reasons.44 Congressional Dysfunction, the beginning title of 
the AALS program and of this preface, certainly implies that congres-
sional inaction constitutes a dysfunction that enhances the legitimacy 
of the Obama administration’s response to act alone. DACA and 
DAPA after all are the by-product of at least a decade of repeated 
attempts to pass the Dream Act;45 similar stories of congressional 
gridlock can also be told of women’s rights to equal pay46 and climate 
change,47 to name a few. Professors Hari Osofsky and Jacqueline 
40. Chen, supra note 17, at Part II.
41. See Christine N. Cimini, Hands Off Fingerprints: State, Local, and Individual Defiance 
of Federal Immigration Enforcement, 47 CONN. L. REV. 101, 120 (2014).
42. Chen, supra note 17, at 21–22.
43. Id. at 40–41.
44. Ezra Kein, 14 Reasons Why This is the Worst Congress Ever, WASH. POST (July 13, 
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is-
the-worst-congress-ever/.
45. Marisa Bono, When a Rose is Not a Rose: DACA, The Dream Act, and the Need for 
More Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 193, 207–08 (2015).
46. Deborah J. Vagins, Equal Pay by the Numbers, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 4, 
2014, 12:02 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/equal-pay-numbers.
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Peel, in their essay titled The Grass is Not Always Greener: Congres-
sional Dysfunction, Executive Action, and Climate Change in Com-
parative Perspectives remind us, however, that legislative gridlock is 
not a structural flaw of our form of government; rather, it is simply the 
result of what happens in a strong system of checks and balances 
when the country is closely divided on issues along partisan lines.48
The United States as a nation has experienced a worsening of parti-
sanship across the board in the past two decades.49 This, and not 
“congressional dysfunction,” is at the core of the governing challenge. 
An alternative form of government such as that of Australia in which 
the legislative body and the Prime Minister share the same political 
party results in different expression of  the system that is in the end 
not much better; namely, flip flop (where policies change from admin-
istration to administration) over gridlock.50 Either case results in poli-
cies and practices not guaranteed to last beyond the administration, 
despite the best of intentions. If we agree with the Obama administra-
tion’s policies, our inclination might well be to perceive sole adminis-
trative acts as necessary and good to move the country forward. 
Nevertheless, Professors Osofsky and Peel insightfully remind us that 
the costs to this is its very temporariness. The arduous and long task 
of bringing the nation closer is still necessary to effectuate lasting 
change.
Finally, the legitimacy of the Obama administration’s acts cannot 
be disengaged from perceptions over their moral imperative. The 
moral inquiry asks whether the end justifies the means insofar as the 
administration must act either to avoid a great harm or to remedy a 
terrible injustice. Here, however, there will inevitably be disagree-
ments over the urgency or the justice of the measures. In general, the 
Obama administration’s actions have been to push for rights or for 
environmental justice, with notable exceptions.51 Professor Mary Pat 
Treuthart in her essay titled Feminist-In-Chief? Examining President 
Obama’s Executive Orders on Women’s Rights Issues, for example, 
documents how, by and large, the Obama administration has fared 
well in terms of the promotion of the rights of women, such as in the 
48. Osofsky & Peel, supra note 18, at 143.
49. Id. at 143-44.
50. Id. at Part II(C).
51. The notable exceptions include President Obama’s national security and immigration 
enforcement measures, which are discussed in this volume in the essays by Professor Sudha 
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areas of gender-based violence, reproductive rights, and employ-
ment.52 This preface has also alluded several times to the significant 
benefit from a rights-based perspective that DACA and DAPA have 
represented to thousands of immigrants. In each of these areas, alt-
hough, the Obama administration has had to weigh or bear the politi-
cal costs of furthering a particular policy that is too controversial in the 
context of a deeply divided nation. For example, Professor Treuthart 
raises two exceptions to the Obama administration’s otherwise favor-
able assessment with regard to women: the treatment of abortion 
funding under the Affordable Care Act and the issue of sexual assault 
in the military.53 In the area of immigration, the “deporter-in-chief” la-
bel given to President Obama for his role in deporting more immi-
grants than any other president of the United States,54 did not shield 
him from the fury against his DACA and DAPA measures. This phe-
nomenon is documented well in Professor Catherine Y. Kim’s essay 
titled Presidential Legitimacy Through the Anti-Discrimination Lens. 
Professor Kim makes the important point that the pro-immigration 
measures had a greater political cost for the Obama administration 
than other less-controversial measures (such as in the areas of envi-
ronmental justice and women’s rights) even when these measures 
also raised equivalent concerns over the structural problems of sep-
aration of powers and checks and balances.55
52. Treuthart, supra note 19. 
53. Id. at 197-200.
54. Anna Gonzalez-Barrera & Jens Manuel Krogstad, U.S. Deportations of Immigrants 
Reach Record High in 2013, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2014/10/02/u-s-deportations-of-immigrants-reach-record-high-in-2013/.
55. Kim, supra note 16.
